垂直性研究与开发合作联盟的博弈模型新探

A New Look at Game Models for Vertical Research and Development of Cooperative Unions

修改了Banerjee和Lin (2 0 0 1)提出的博弈模型 ,在考虑了组成研究与开发 (R&D)成本因素的条件下 ,重新考察了产业内形成垂直的R&D合作联盟的动机 ,得出上游 (或下游 )企业的利润与下游企业的数目之间并不存在特定的关系 ,根据CassimanBrano (2 0 0 0 )的研究结论 。

After modifying the game model proposed by Banerjee and Lin (2001) and considering the conditions consisting of R&D cost factor, the paper reviews the motives of the vertical R&D cooperative union formed within the industry, thus arriving at a conclusion that there is no specific relation between the profit of the upstream (or downstream) enterprises and the number of the downstream enterprises. Based on the research results of Cassiman Brano (2000), it is held that R&D subsidies should be provided for the fundamental research in industries.