国有中小型企业改制中股权设置问题的探讨

On Structure of State-owned Stocks of the Reformed State-owned Enterprisesof Small and Medium Sizes

本文讨论了在国有中小型企业改制过程中 ,如何从股本结构策略的角度来吸引民间资本的问题。国有资本与民间资本的股权设置实际上可以看作是两者之间的博弈。本文利用博弈论中的“智猪模型”讨论了这个问题 ,得出结论 :在一定条件下 ,为了发展国有中小型企业 ,使国有资本实现真正的保值和增值 ,可以放弃国有资本对控股权的要求。

The article devotes to the problem on how to raise capital from individuals by strategically designing the structure of stocks in reforming the state-owned enterprises of small and medium sizes. The designing of the structure of the state-owned stocks and private ones is actually a game between them two. By employing the iterated dominance equilibrium in game theory, this problem is studied to draw the conclusion that under certain circumstances, we can give up the state-owned stock control as to better develop the state-owned enterprises of small and medium sizes.