摘要
地方保护实质是地区间竞争的一种“囚徒困境”博弈 ,各地采取保护行为是地区间博弈的纳什均衡。
The crux of the local market protection is a 'prisoners dilemma' game among regional competitions. Market protection is 'Nash Equilibrium' in the games. The root of 'Non Pareto Equilibrium' is the inappropriate incentive and constraint mechanism that centrial government applies to local governments.
出处
《洛阳工学院学报（社会科学版）》
2002年第1期48-52,共5页
Journal of Luoyang Institute of Technology(Social Science)
关键词
地方市场
市场保护
博弈
local market
market protection
game theory
