劳动契约、交易费用与关系治理——华人家族企业内部治理行为分析

Labor Contract, Transact Cost and Relation Governance: Analysis on Internal Governance Behaviors in Chinese Clan Corporations

本文运用交易费用经济学的分析框架并结合现代契约理论 ,通过劳动契约及其规制结构分析 ,对华人家族企业内劳动契约中存在的用关系替代正式制度、用家庭式责任强化关系的“关系治理”现象进行研究 ,并试图证明 ,各国及各类企业对劳动契约中不同类型的注重源自于不同劳动契约的达成与执行费用的不同 ,不同契约的费用差异取决于相应的制度对契约当事人行为的有效性 ,而制度对契约当事人行为的有效性与这种制度和当事人所受影响文化的适应性程度密切相关。

The Authors combine the analytical structure of transaction cost economics with modern contract theory, and discuss the phenomena of 'relation governance' in which the relation instead of formal institution is strengthened by family responsibility in labor contract in Chinese clan corporations, through the analysis of labor contract and rule structure. Furthermore, the authors try to demonstrate the differences of labor contract importance in different countries and corporations originate from the differences of compass and application costs in different labor contracts, and the differences of contract costs rest on the validity of relative institutions to party behaviors. Moreover, the validity is related to the adaptability of cultural influences.