摘要
罗伯特·帕特南的“双层次博弈”理论认为,在有关国际谈判时国内与国际因素互动的过程中,影响第二层次“博弈”的因素有多个。本文将重点考察的是,在国际谈判以达成合作协议过程中,美国行政当局和国会的不同作用以及他们之间的相互制约。
According to the 'Two-Level Game Theory' put forward by the US political science scholar Robert Putnam, there are many factors which can exert their effects on the 'second level game' in an international negotiation. In this essay, the author mainly focuses on the analysis of the roles the US administrative authorities and the US Congress play, as well as the interaction between these US governmental branches in the international negotiations to reach cooperative agreements.
出处
《同济大学学报(社会科学版)》
2002年第2期42-48,共7页
Journal of Tongji University:Social Science Edition
基金
同济大学人文社会科学基金
项目编号:0700219022
关键词
双层次'博弈'
美国国会
行政当局
外交政策
LII Game
US Congress
US Administrative Authorities
US Executive Departments and Institutions
Foreign Policy