摘要
“恶性增资”行为广泛存在于各种组织结构中 ,对组织的资源配置产生重大影响。传统理论认为 ,恶性增资是错误或非理性决策过程的结果。然而 ,传统理论在解释恶性增资行为方面是不全面的 ,因为它没有提供一种有效的机制来区分合理的增资行为和不合理的增资行为。本文在介绍说明传统理论的基础上 ,运用实物期权理论对恶性增资行为作了进一步的解释 ,证明有些被认为是不合理的增资行为在有些情况下是合理的 ,是出自组织利益最大化的正确选择。实物期权理论是对增资行为传统理论的有力补充。
Escalation of commitment is a popular phenomenon in all kinds of organizations, greatly affecting the collocation of resources. Traditional theories of escalation assume that the phenomenon is dysfunctional and results from flawed, or irrational decision-making. But the traditional theories give an incomplete picture because they haven't provided a mechanism for distinguishing warranted from unwarranted escalation. After introducing the raditional theories, the paper gives a further explanatin of unwarranted escalation by employing the real options theory and it shows that some projects that might be viewed as cases of escalation of commitment, actually involve situations in which escalation is warranted, and which is the correct choice of the maximization of profits of an organization. The real options theory perspective offers new theoretical insights that challenge the raditional assumptions, and forceful complement to the traditional theories of excalation.
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2002年第7期75-80,共6页
Journal of Finance and Economics