信息不对称性下的利益冲突与激励贷款合同

Interest Conflicts and Incentive Contract Designs Under Information Asymmetry

本文首先实证调查和研究了我国银行等金融机构面临的高度信息不对称及由此产生的贷款风险 ;接着从理论和实务的角度研究了不对称信息下的利益冲突 ,以及银行为保护自己的利益 ,应如何设计具有激励特征的贷款合同以降低贷款过程中的风险 ,并达成各方的利益平衡。

The paper firstly investigates and studies the high information asymmetry and high risks empirically which Chinese financial institutions such as banks face in loan contracting.Then the paper studies how interest conflicts are produced under information asymmetry theoretically and professionally respectively, and explores how to design incentive loan contracts to reduce risks in the process of loan contracting to protect bank′s interests and balance all individual party′s interests.