摘要
本文应用二人主从Stackelberg博弈模型研究中央政府与地方政府财政转移支付的纵向均衡问题 ,根据问题本身建立了一个既考虑激励机制又考虑约束机制的双层规划模型 ,通过模型的求解得到了确定转移支付总量的解析表达式。并对其结果给出了直观的几何解释。为研究财政转移支付纵向均衡的总量分配给出了一个可以具体操作一种思路和方法。
In this paper,a two human principal and subordinate Stackelberg game model is applied to the analysis of the finance vertical imbalance problem between central government and local government. According to the problem, a model on two level optimization is set up. In this model, both incentive system and constrained system are considered. A functional expression of determining transfer payment total and a note is given by the solution of the model and its image. A new thought and method is provided for the study of assigning for the total of the finance vertical imbalance problem.
出处
《运筹与管理》
CSCD
2002年第1期28-34,共7页
Operations Research and Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金项目<财政体制的博弈分析>(70 0 730 18)
财政部科研项目<国债金融预警系统>