企业“恶性增资”现象的期权分析

“恶性增资”行为广泛存在于各种组织结构中,对组织的资源配置产生重大影响。传统理论认为,恶性增资是错误或非理性决策过程的结果。然而,传统理论在解释恶性增资行为方面是不完全的,因为它们没有提供一种有效的机制来区分合理的增资行为和不合理的增资行为。本文在介绍说明传统理论的基础上,运用实物期权理论对恶性增资行为进行了进一步的解释,证明有些被认为不合理的增资行为在有些情况下是合理的,是出自组织利益最大化的正确选择。实物期权理论对传统假设提出了挑战,并且是对增资行为传统理论的有力补充。

Escalation of commitment is a popular phenomenon in all kinds of organizations.It greatly effects the collocation of resource.Tradional theories of escalation assume that the phenomenon is dysfunctional and resulted from flawed,or irrational decision-making.But the traditional theories give an incomplete picture because they do not provide a mechanism for distinguishing warranted from unwarranted escalation.This paper applies real options theory to show that some projects that might be viewed as cases of unwarranted escalation,actually involve situations in which escalation is warranter.The real options theory perspective offers new theoretical insights that challenge the traditional assumptions.