快速工业化地区农村集体建设用地流转的博弈分析———以广东省佛山市南海区为例(英文)

Game Analysis of Rural Collective Construction Land Circulation in Rapidly Industrialized Area of China——A Case of Nanhai District of Foshan City

概述了博弈论的基本原理及博弈的分类,提出了研究的前提假设和博弈模型的要素。农村建设用地流转博弈模型的要素包括:①行为主体,涉及国家、地方政府、农村集体经济组织、农户、建设用地转入者等4个层级5个方面;②行动空间,农村建设用地流转博弈各方的行动选择取决于其他方的行动选择;③效用函数,分别构建了地方政府和农村集体经济组织的效用函数。在此基础上,以中国广东省佛山市南海区为例,得出了农村建设用地流转博弈模型的结果:集体建设用地选择不流转时的效用组合为(0,0);被征用时的效用组合为(160,-40);自主流转时的效用组合为(100,120～60)。研究表明:在现有宏观经济和制度条件下,快速工业化区域农村建设用地扩张及流转的最佳方式是,在不改变土地所有制的前提下依法依规自主流转;调控和规范自主流转的有效途径是,通过实行建设用地需求管理、强化用地空间管制、加强农村土地市场制度建设及完善利益分配机制,优化博弈结构与博弈各方的效用函数。最后,提出了调控农村建设用地流转与扩张的政策建议。一是转变工业化与城镇化发展模式,实行建设用地需求管理;二是强化用地空间管制和市场制度建设,改进流转博弈结构;三是完善利益分配机制和效用函数关系,规范博弈各方的行为选择。

This paper introduces the basic principles and application of game theory, sets up the game model of rural construction land circulation, and analyzes the utility function results under the approval of local government of China, taking Nanhai District of Foshan City as an example. Research result shows that under the current macro-economy and system conditions, the optimal way of rural construction land circulation and expansion in rapidly industrialized area is to realize independent circulation in accordance with laws and regulations without changing the land ownership. The effective approach of regulating and controlling independent circulation is to optimize game structure and the utility functions by implementing demand management of construction land, strengthening land space control, reinforcing the construction of rural land market system, and improving profit distribution mechanism. Finally, we put forward some policy proposals on how to regulate the rural construction land circulation and expansion.