秦岭贫困山区退耕还林(草)和禁伐政策实施低效的博弈解析

Game Analysis on Inefficiency of Policy in Transformation of Farm Land and Felling Trees Forbiddenness in Poverty Area of Qinling Mountain

根据博弈论基本原理 ,探讨了在秦岭贫困山区实施退耕还林 (草 )和禁伐政策过程中 ,各经济利益主体的不同经济行为动机及其相关现象。研究指出 ,造成退耕还林 (草 )和禁伐政策实施低效的原因是各博弈主体由于利己思想 ,而难以摆脱“囚徒困境”。据此 ,必须建立以合作为中心 ,以符合各主体经济利益为目的的协调机制 ,实现贫困山区退耕还林 (草 )和禁伐政策的顺利实施。

The different behavior intention and related phenomena of every economic interest part are explored based on the game theory during the transformation from farm land to reforestation and felling trees forbiddenness in the poverty mountain area. The reasons of policy inefficient implemented are 'zero-sum game' of every gamble part, so they could not break away from 'prisoners dilemma'. Harmony mechanism whose center is cooperation and aim is in accordance with every part economic interest must be established.