生态资源与可持续开发

Ecological Resources and Sustainable Exploitation

用委托 -代理理论研究了对称信息情况下政府管理可再生资源开发活动的激励问题。通过建立并分析资源可持续开发的数学模型表明 ,政府实施生态平衡管理有助于降低开发人对可再生资源的开发努力度 ,在政府及开发人都是风险中性的条件下 ,激励合同不仅依赖于所观测到的产出 ,而且依赖于生物种 (类 )群的内禀增长率。

Based on the principal agent theory, and under the symmetric information, the incentives are discussed of the administrative exploitation of ecological. By founding a mathematical model, the government enforcement of the ecological balance will cut down the exertion of exploitation. When the risks are neutral, the incentive contract will not only depend on the output value to be observed, but also on the finite of increase rate of ecological resources.