摘要
本文研究了我国银行业在国家隐性保险背景下,市场约束机制的有效性问题。通过对价格约束效应、数量约束效应在银行客户存款市场和非客户存款负债市场的比较,研究发现,银行存款客户对银行不存在市场约束行为,而银行非客户存款负债债权人,存在对银行风险中流动性相关风险的价格约束和数量约束效应。国家隐性担保覆盖了所有银行,对大型商业银行的市场约束效应显著弱于其他商业银行。
This paper studied the effectiveness of market discipline in China bank industry under implicit government guarantees. By comparison of price effects and quantity effects in two types of funding markets, that is the customer deposit market and the non-customer deposit funding market, it is found that there is no market discipline in customer deposit market. However, price and quantity constraints against bank liquidity risk are found in the non-customer deposit funding market. The implicit government guarantees cover all the banks, and the market discipline for the biggest commercial banks is much weaker than those for other banks.
出处
《上海交通大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第4期105-112,共8页
Journal of Shanghai Jiao tong University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)
关键词
市场约束
银行风险
银行流动性
隐性保险
market discipline
bank risk
bank liquidity
implicit government guarantees