地方GDP压力、地方国有企业产值操控与经济后果

GDP Pressure,SOE Output Manipulation,and Economic Consequences

财政分权体制和企业"规模效应"①导致地方政府更关心企业产值增长,投资拉动地方GDP最终也反映在相关企业的产值增长上。本文以中国上市公司(2009年-2012年的季度数据)为样本研究了地方政府干预地方国有企业进行产值操控的动因及其经济后果。研究结果发现:上季度地方GDP相对业绩与地方国有企业产值操控负相关;地方政府直接控制的公司更容易进行产值操控;GDP相对业绩对地方国有企业产值操控行为的影响并未因为政府控制方式的不同而有所差异;地方国有企业的产值操控对未来短中期的经营业绩产生不利影响。

This paper investigates the government＇s motivation to intervene local SOE output value and its economic consequences. Investment can improve GDP and it eventually is reflected in the local output value. Thus under the ＂fiscal decentrali- zation system＂ together with the ＂scale effect＂, the local government is concerned much more about local output. Using quarterly data of listed companies from 2009 to 2012, we research the relationship between local SOE output control and local GDP and the impact on firms＇ future performance. We find that when the performance of GDP is relatively poor, local SOE output value control is likely to be more severe. Furthermore, there is no significant difference between local government directly controlled SOEs and indirectly controlled SOEs, regarding how the performance of local GDP affects firm output value. Finally, the local SOE output value control will adversely affect the short term future operating performance.