美德的转向及其再转向

Virtue's Turn and Return

美德伦理学与美德认识论两者在整个"现代哲学"时期一起衰败,但最近已经复兴。共同的复兴,加之大多数非西方文化属于美德伦理学的某种形式这一事实,某种程度上支持了现代哲学构成一种中世纪时期就不可避免的认识论和伦理学美德方法最终会繁荣的观点。现代西方出现的新个人主义导致主观笛卡尔主义者转向,并且强调与人道主义相对立的权利,但是这些现代性"震荡"也许正在消失而朝向善,当今美德理论的强大可能是历史发展的一种见证。但是中国从来没有经历现代西方所出现的广义个人主义类型,这就是为什么儒家美德传统从未像亚里士多德主义在西方衰退那样而在中国衰退。并且,当代情感主义美德伦理学在其强调道德谦卑方面类似于儒学而不同于亚里士多德主义,这一事实在某种程度上表明亚里士多德主义并不是美德伦理学不可避免的道路。而且,因为谦卑也是一种认识美德,美德认识论比起其先前所认识到的,或许也必须更多地向强调与他人同感的情感主义学习。

Both virtue ethics and virtue epistemology were in eclipse during the period of ＂modern philosophy＂ but have recently revived. That common revival, plus the fact that most non-Western cultures subscribe to some form of virtue ethics, gives some support to the idea that modern philosophy constitutes a kind of medieval period with respect to the inevitable eventual flourishing of virtue approaches to epistemology and ethics. The new individualism that arose in the modern West led to the subjective Cartesian turn and to an emphasis on rights as opposed to humanitarian concerns, but these ＂shudders＂ of modernity may be wearing off for good, and the strength of present-day virtue theories may be a testimony to that historical development. But China has never experienced the kind of generalized individualism that emerged in the modern West, and that is why the Confucian virtue tradition was never eclipsed the way Aristotelianism was in the West. And the fact that contemporary sentimentalist virtue ethics resembles Confucianism and differs from Aristotelianism in its emphasis on moral humility is some indication that Aristotelianism is not the inevitable way forward for virtue ethics. Moreover, since humility is also an epistemic virtue, virtue epistemology may have more to learn from a sentimentalism that emphasizes empathy with the point of view of others, than it has previously recognized.