摘要
本文以2007-2011年大股东减持数据为样本,采用面板数据的静态固定效应模型,实证分析了股票全流通时代大股东掏空和减持之间的关系。研究发现,大股东掏空越严重,大股东减持概率和减持比例越大。通过对上市公司的实际控制人进行分组以后发现,对于私人控制的上市公司,大股东掏空越严重,大股东当年的减持概率和减持比例越大;而对于政府控制的上市公司,大股东掏空和减持之间不存在显著关系。
Using the data the large shareholders reduce their shares from 2007 to 2011 as a sample,and static fixed effects panel data model,this paper empirically analyzes the relationship between tunneling and share reduction of large shareholders.The research fuund,the more serious the tunneling of large shareholders,the greater the probability large shareholders to reduce their shares and the greater the proportion of reduction.By grouping the actual controller of these listing Corporations,this paper found,for the private control of the listing Corporation,the more serious the tunneling of large shareholders,the the greater the probability large shareholders to reduce their shares and the greater the proportion of reduction.But for the the listing Corporation controlled by the governtnent,there is no significant correlation between tunneling and reduction.Take into account the endogeneity problem and after the processing of it,the results remain robust.
出处
《财会通讯(下)》
2014年第6期56-60,129,共5页
Communication of Finance and Accounting
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(项目编号:11YJC790122)
国家社会科学基金项目(项目编号:13CGL050)的阶段性成果
关键词
大股东
掏空
减持
全流通
Large shareholders
Tunneling
Reduction
Full circulation