P2P网络借贷监管的效益与路径--基于演化博弈论视角的研究

The Efficiency and Path Selection of P2P Network Lending Supervisions——A Study based on Evolutionary Game Theory

本文在对P2P网络借贷发展、监管现状阐述分析的基础上,运用演化博弈理论,从两个层次,构建P2P网贷平台之间、P2P网贷平台与监管者之间的动态博弈模型。通过对P2P网贷平台群体行为分析,观察其接受监管意愿大小的决定因素;通过对P2P网贷平台和监管机构两大种群的策略选择组合分析,得出监管部门监管效益高低的决定因素,并经由相关参数的推演分析,做出相应的决策判断和规范机制的路径选择,提出具有针对性和可操作性的建议。

Based on the analysis of the development of P2P network lending and the current status of itssupervisions and regulations, this paper employs the evolutionary game theory to construct two evolutionarygame models, one for P2P network lending platforms, and the other for P2P network lending platform withits supervisors. This paper tries to find the determinants of the willingness of P2P network lending platformsto accept the supervisions by analyzing their collective behaviors, and tries to find the determinants of thesupervision efficiency by studying the strategy choices between P2P network lending platforms and supervisors.By analyzing the evolution of relevant parameters, this paper gives suggestions on how to select the appropriatepath and regulatory mechanism, and finally proposes relevant practical supervision proposals.