低水平均衡的土地分利秩序——论土地开发与村庄政治

The Low-Level Equilibrium of Distributional Structure of Land Profits——on The Land Development and Village Governance

后税费时代,基于"不出事"的逻辑,各种资源类型的村庄都趋向于低水平均衡式的治理。低水平均衡的土地分利秩序中,基层政府、村干部、灰黑势力结成"地利共同体",村民与"地利共同体"之间彼此离散,且村民与村民之间也彼此离散。征地中,"地利共同体"倾向在内部完成主要的土地增值利益分配,基层政府和村干部有意减少与村民的接触,尽量不把村民动员起来协商和讨论。如此暂时表面上没有矛盾,但村庄治理能力却在不断下降,且矛盾持续累积,这为以后更多矛盾的爆发埋下伏笔。

Based on the non-accident logic, the all sorts of resource types of village tend to be the low-level equilibrium ofgovernance in the post-era of tax and fee reform. The low-level equilibrium of distributional structure of land profits madethe local government, village cadres and gangland united into the ＂land-profits community＂ which isolated from local villag-ers. During the land-acquisition process, this so called ＂ land-profits community＂ tended to distributed the most of landprofits in their own community. The local government and village cadres reduced the contact frequency with villagers. Theywere not willing to mobilized villagers toeonsulte and discuss the related issues. Although there was temporarily no conflict,the village governance ablity was falling, and the contradiction was accumulating. Problems above would result in the brea-kout of more contradictions in the future.