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土地征收动态博弈获利模式及地域差异研究 被引量:8

Player benefit models of land expropriation based on sequential game theory and its empirical study for area differences
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摘要 随着我国城市化进程加快,土地征收冲突频发,引起了整个社会和广大学者的广泛关注.我国征收冲突研究的相关理论还处于探讨阶段.在对土地征收利益方、行为策略和获利进行分析的基础上,探讨我国土地征收各博弈方的动态博弈获利模式,并以城市中心区、城乡结合部和偏远农村区为实证,讨论不同地域空间的各博弈方土地征收行为策略及其利益差异和征地冲突发生的可能性.通过研究分析,土地征收中博弈方主要为地方政府和被征地农户,地方政府违法征地行为与农户抗争行为呈反比,当农户趋向于选择抗争策略时,地方政府就趋向于选择合法征地,而农户是否选择抗争取决于抗争成本的高低;地方政府违法征地行为策略的概率越大,农户抗争行为的发生概率也越大,当地方政府选择违法征地时,农户为获得更多的补偿,抗争是其最优选择.研究表明城市中心区征地行为较为和谐,偏远农村区呈现表面和谐的景象,城乡结合部出现征地冲突的几率最大.研究成果可为建立差别化的区域土地征收管理政策奠定理论基础. With the speeding up of urbanization in China,conflicts in land requisition outbreak more frequently,which have caught extensive public and scholars' concern.Theories on land requisition conflicts are still under discussion in China.According to the current laws,regulations and the process of land requisition,game players in China's land requisition include local governments and land-expropriated farmers.Based on analysis of players,and their behaviors and strategies,as well as the payoff ranges in land requisition,which are elements of sequential game theory,the payoff models of local government and farmers in land requisition are built.Analysis to the payoff model of local government tells that probability of local government's illegal land requisition decreases with the probability increasing of farmers' resistance; while farmers choose resistance strategies,local governments are more likely to conduct the land requisition le gally.Whether farmers select resistance or not depend on their resistance costs.The analysis to the payoff model of farmers shows that the higher probability of local government's illegal land requisition is,the higher the probability of farmer's resistance will be; when local governments tend to select illegal land requisition,resistance will be the best choice for farmers to gain more compensation.As an empirical study,players' payoff models of land requisition are used to discuss the differences of players' strategies,the range of payoff,and the probability of conflicts among three different areas as the urban center,the rural-urban continuum and the remote countryside.The results shows that it is relatively harmonious in the urban center,seemingly harmonious in the remote countryside,while land requisition conflicts more likely to occur in the rural-urban continuum.The study results may provide a theoretical basis for the establishment of differential land management policies in different areas.
出处 《华中师范大学学报(自然科学版)》 CAS 北大核心 2014年第4期606-612,共7页 Journal of Central China Normal University:Natural Sciences
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(41271534 40771088) 华中师范大学自主创新项目(CCNU10A02001)
关键词 征地冲突 博弈获利模式 地域差异 conflicts in land requisition payoff models of players area differences
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