金融创新与金融监管的结构性错配问题研究——理论逻辑与经验证据

Structural Mismatch between Financial Innovation and Supervision:Theoretical Logic and Empirical Evidence

过度的金融创新经由多重渠道引致和强化了忽略风险、复杂风险等新型风险形态,加剧了金融体系的脆弱性。文章应用全球银行数据库研究发现,金融创新与监管从业务匹配、周期协同性和风险承担激励等方面存在着结构性错配问题。以资本充足为核心的监管强度呈现出典型的顺周期性,危机前的宽松监管与之后的严厉监管未能起到周期平滑效果;混业与综合经营方面则表现为业务监管错配,组织架构上的重复监管与监管真空并存;从激励上看,监管未能有效抑制商业银行的风险承担行为。文章进而从金融制度供给与需求的非对称性角度对二者错配的制度根源进行探讨,并据此提出对策建议。

Excess financial innovation through multiple channels could lead to new risk forms like the neglect of risks and complex risk, intensifying the vulnerability of financial system. Based on global bank database, this paper confirms the structural mismatch between financial innova tion and supervision in aspects such as business matching, cycle synergy and risktaking incen tives. Supervision strength taking capital adequacy as the core is featured by typical procyclicality and relaxed and stringent supervision before and after the crisis respectively do not play the cycle smoothing role; in aspect of mixed and consolidated business, there exists business supervision mismatch, namely coexisting of repeated supervision and supervision vacuum. As for incentives, supervision cannot effectively inhibit risktaking behavior of commercial banks. Furthermore, it discusses the institutional origin of structural mismatch from the perspective of supply and de mand of financial system and accordingly puts forward countermeasures.