董事会治理和财务治理的作用效应——基于应计与真实活动盈余管理的实证检验被引量：9

The Effects of Board Governance and Financial Governance——Empirical Evidence based on Accrual and Real Earnings Management

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摘要本文以A股上市公司为研究对象,研究了董事会治理和财务治理对应计和真实活动盈余管理的作用效应。研究发现:高质量的董事会治理能显著抑制管理层的真实活动盈余管理,这种抑制作用主要是独立董事独立性和董事激励与约束机制发挥作用的结果;而财务治理通过有效的财务控制能显著降低管理层向上的应计盈余管理,通过财务激励和财务监督机制能显著降低其应计盈余管理的程度。此外,在抑制管理层的真实活动盈余管理方面,董事会治理与财务治理存在替代作用。 Based on the data from A-share listed companies of China, this paper investigates the effects of board governance and financial governance on accruals and real earnings management. It has been that high-quality board governance can significantly inhibit real earnings management, and this effect mainly comes from the role of independent director, director incentive and constraint mechanisms. Meanwhile, financial governance can significantly reduce the upward accruals earnings management through the effective financial control and significantly restrain the extent of accruals earnings management by financial incentive and supervision mechanisms. In addition, there is a substitution effect between board governance and financial governance in reducing real earning management.

作者高明华方芳

机构地区北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院

出处《经济与管理研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第8期108-119,共12页 Research on Economics and Management

基金国家社会科学基金重点项目"深入推动国有经济战略性调整研究"(12AZD059) 中央高校基本科研业务费专项"中国公司治理分类指数系列" 大华会计师事务所(特殊普通合伙)横向课题"会计师事务所改制风险管理与责任分担"(66400056)

关键词董事会治理财务治理应计盈余管理真实活动盈余管理 Board Governance Financial Governance Accruals Earnings Management Real Earnings Management

分类号 F275 [经济管理—企业管理]

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