契约论视阈下债务融资治理效应研究

Research on Governance Effects of Debt Financing in the Perspective of Contract Theory

以我国沪深两市的A股上市公司为研究样本,运用契约理论,通过构建多元回归模型,对公司债务融资的治理效应进行实证研究。研究表明,我国上市公司的债务融资并不能对管理层发挥很好的激励和约束作用,从而不能显著地降低公司的代理成本,也没有提高公司绩效,即公司债务融资契约没有发挥出其应有的治理效应。

This paper builds multiple regression models to study the corporate governance effects of debts using Chinese listed companies＂ data. The empirical result shows that corporate debt financing has no motivational and constraining impacts on management, cannot reduce the a- gency costs or improve corporation＇s performance. In other words, debt financing does not exert its proper governance effects.