分析师跟踪与企业盈余管理--来自中国上市公司的证据

Analyst Following and Corporate Earnings Management:Evidence from China

本文利用中国上市公司2005～2011年的数据，通过检验分析师跟踪对企业盈余管理和报告微利行为的影响，发现了分析师在减少盈余管理上的监管作用，证明我国分析师能够对声誉较高的名企形成有效的监督机制。分析师的存在，显著地降低了名企盈余管理的规模和报告微利的概率，但对普通企业的影响并不明显。这说明要想分析师对企业起到监督作用，还需要其它的外部因素。以上结论在控制了分析师选择企业的内生性以后依然成立。

Using a data set of China＇s public firms from 2005 to 2011, this research examines the roles playedby analysts in reducing corporate earnings management. Controlling for other firm characteristics, including firmsize, industry and leverage, we find that firms followed by more analysts manage their earnings less and havelower probability to report small positive earnings. To address the potential endogeneity problem ofanalysts＇coverage, we use an instrumental variable approach which is based on the firm＇s inclusion in the Shang-hai - Shenzhen 300 composite index and find that our results hold robust. We also find that the main result isdriven by reputable firms instead of ordinary firms, which indicates that other co - factors is needed for analyststo be a monitoring power in corporate China. Policy implications are provided at last.