期刊文献+

组织特征及治理机制对高管股权激励强度的影响

The influence of organization characteristics and governance mechanism on senior executives′equity incentive intensity
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摘要 以中国A股市场2007~2010年实施股权激励计划的上市公司高管样本数据为例,从高管个体人力资本产权实现的理论视角,在尽可能排除或减少财务资本产权影响的情况下,实证分析了组织特征及治理机制对高管人员股权激励强度的影响效应。结论显示,相对于非国有性质,国有公司高管股权激励强度更高;企业成长性越高,公司高管股权激励强度越高;企业规模越大、企业风险性越大、董事会独立性越高、股权集中度越高、资产负债率越高、上市公司高管股权激励强度越低。 Based on the panel data of the listed companies in China′s Stock Market during 2007-2010 and from the theoretical perspective of human capital property rights realization ,this paper empirically ana-lyzes organization characteristics and governance mechanism influencing Equity Incentive Intensity for Senior Executives in listed companies .The study shows that ,compared with senior executives from non-state-ow ned listed companies ,those from state-ow ned can obtain more equity incentive ;the same situation applies to those who work in high-growth enterprises ;while senior executives from enterprises with the following features obtain less equity incentive :larger companies ,higher risk ,higher ownership concentration ,higher assets liabilities ratio and independence of board of directors .
作者 孙永生
出处 《西安工程大学学报》 CAS 2014年第3期349-356,共8页 Journal of Xi’an Polytechnic University
基金 教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金(13YJA630080) 陕西省普通高校哲学社会科学特色学科建设项目"陕西纺织经济管理研究中心" 陕西高校哲学社会科学重点研究基地基金(陕教位[2009]6号) 西安工程大学博士科研启动基金项目(BS1322)
关键词 股权激励 股权激励强度 组织特征 治理机制 equity incentive equity incentive intensity organization characteristics governance mecha-nism
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参考文献27

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