产品市场竞争、管理层权力与高管薪酬—规模敏感性

Product Market Competition,Managerial Power and Executive Pay-scale Sensitivity

高管薪酬契约一直被作为缓解企业委托—代理矛盾的必要手段,如何设计薪酬契约中各影响因素的权重将决定着契约的效率。规模因素作为薪酬契约中重要的因素,在契约中占据着极其重要的地位。本文从管理层权力视角出发,研究管理层权力对规模因素的影响,以及公司治理对权力滥用的抑制作用。研究发现,企业高管可以凭借管理层权力提高薪酬—规模敏感性,降低自身薪酬风险,而作为企业外部治理机制的产品市场竞争对这种权力滥用有显著的治理效应。此外,企业所处的成长性环境差异对薪酬契约有重要影响,高成长性企业既有着相对较高的薪酬—规模敏感性,又能为产品市场竞争提供较大的治理空间,从而提高竞争对薪酬契约的治理效应。

Executive compensation contract is treated as necessary means to ease the agency problem.How to design the weight of each influential factor will determine the efficiency of the contract.As the most important factor,corporate scale takes a considerable position in the contract.From the perspective of the managerial power,this article studies the impact of the executive power on the corporation scale,and how corporate governance restrains the abuse of managerial power.The result shows that the corporate executives can enhance the executive pay-scale sensitivity and reduce the risk of remuneration by managerial power.As the external governance,market competition can effectively inhibit the abuse of the managerial power.In addition,the study also shows that the growth of the enterprise has a big influence on compensation contracts.High-growth companies have relatively high pay-scale sensitivity,and they leave a larger space for market competition governance to make improvements on the compensation contracts.