我国商业医疗保险中的道德风险

Moral Hazard in the Commercial Medical Insurance in China

本文运用CHNS数据库1989～2009年的微观数据，考察我国商业医疗保险购买决策以及商业医疗保险对医疗支出的影响，前者用Logit模型进行估计，后者用固定效应模型进行估计。回归结果显示，我国商业医疗保险市场的逆向选择不存在，而道德风险存在，在控制健康、收入等因素的情况下，购买了商业医疗保险的人显著增加了医疗支出。

Utilizing the micro data of the CHNS database between 1989 and 2009 ,this paper conducted an analysis on the factors determining the choice of purchasing commercial medical insurance, as well as the impact of owning commercial medical insurance on the medical expenditure. A Logit model was adopted to estimate the former impact, and a fixed-effect model to estimate the latter. As was demonstrated in the results, adverse selection in the medical insurance market was not very conspicuous, while the moral hazard did exist. Given the fixed health status, income and etc. , people who owned a commercial insurance had a comparatively larger medical expenditure.