劳资博弈“囚徒困境”的合作解:工资集体协商

Possible Cooperation of “Prison Dilemma” in Labor- capital Game:Collective Wage Consultation

从博弈论的视角看,劳资双方博弈的过程与囚徒困境的博弈非常相似,分析劳资博弈囚徒困境的原因及探寻劳资博弈的合作解具有很强的理论意义。作为劳资博弈囚徒困境合作解的一种现实选择路径,工资集体协商与预期、重复博弈以及帕累托效率之间的关系又极具现实研究意义。

From the perspective of the game theory, the game process between employee and employer is similar to Prison Dilemma, so it is theoretically significant to analyze the reasons of the game between the two parties of labor relations and to seek the possible cooperation. As an optional choice, collective wage consultation is critical to solving such a dilemma. So it is of great importance to explain how collective wage consultation helps to coordinate labor relations when related to expectation, repeated game and Pareto efficiency.