“公司+农户”型订单农业供应链的Nash协商模型

Coordination for "company+farmer" contract-farming supply chain under Nash negotiation model

研究了一类由农户与公司构成的"公司+农户"型订单农业经营模式下的农产品供应链,其中农户在考虑产出不确定性以及订单价格的基础上确定农产品的生产量,公司拥有农产品的批发定价权,并在产出与需求双重不确定性情形下确定农产品的订单价格和零售价格.对比分析了供应链集中决策与分散决策下公司和农户的最优决策行为.研究结果表明,在订单农业经营模式下公司可以通过主导地位从中获取绝大部分的收益,而且实践中普遍存在的"保底收购,随行就市"价格机制无法防止公司在市场行情不好时的机会主义行为.为此,引入一种基于Nash协商的收益共享契约机制来协调公司与农户之间的利益.实施该契约机制不仅可以实现"公司+农户"型订单农业供应链的完美协调,还能带来社会福利的增加.

In this paper, we investigate a contract farming supply chain consisting of an agribusinessfirm and a farmer for the production and supply of agricultural products, where the farmer determines theproduction quantity by taking into account of the wholesale price set by the agribusiness firm and the likelyuncertainty of the natural condition during the growing season, while the agribusiness firm determines thewholesale price and the retail price by taking into account of the yielded agricultural products and the likelyuncertainty of market demand. The agribusiness firm＇s and the farmer＇s optimal decision making behaviorsunder centralized and decentralized supply chain are analyzed. The results show that the predominance ofthe agribusiness firm will gain most of the agricultural supply chain＇s revenue, and the popular protectionprice contract can not prevent the opportunist behavior of the agribusiness firm during the decliningmarket situation. Therefore, we develop a kind of revenue sharing contract mechanism based on Nashnegotiation model to fiLcilitate coordination between the two parties. In addition, the proposed revenuesharing mechanism can not only coordinate the agricultural supply chain of ＂company ＋ farmer＂ contract-farming perfectly, but also increase in the social welfare.