概念的具身认知观

Embodied Cognition of Concepts

针对传统认知科学中非模态符号观的若干局限、传统"概念"观中情境独立性、客观唯一性等质疑,具身认知思想认为概念、体验、情境通过概念的具身性可以得到整合。概念的情境性、模拟性和体验性共同阐释了概念的具身认知观;概念具有情境性,具有与情境黏合的体验性,并且通过模拟性加以实现。以特殊的方式,情境得以概念化,成为概念知识的一部分,并且通过主体的内省状态积淀为一种情绪体验。大脑模拟了知觉、动作、内省状态的激活,可以再演当时的实际体验,从而实现了可以脱离具体事物的依赖,使符号化的概念加工成为现实。概念在其结构与过程中都体现了体验性。身体始终在概念-体验-情境关系中具有重要角色和不可缺失的功能。

Concepts, emotion and situation could be integrated into the embodiment of concepts based on the theories of embodied cognition, which could overcome the limitations of amodal symbol theories in traditional cognitive science, and query for traditional view of concepts which was independent of situation, objectivity. Embodiment of concepts could be re-flected from three aspects： situated, simulated, and experiential, namely, concepts were situated, experiential with situation, and achieved by simulation. Situation was conceptualized, became one part of concept knowledge and the emotional experi-ential in one specific way. Brain could simulate the activation of perception, action and introspection state, react the actu-al experiential. Therefore, concepts processing was divorced from concrete objects and possible to be. Experiential of con-cepts could be embodied by its structure and process. Body was always an indispensable key point in concepts-experien-tial-situation relationship.