期刊文献+
任意字段
题名或关键词
题名
关键词
文摘
作者
第一作者
机构
刊名
分类号
参考文献
作者简介
基金资助
栏目信息

匹配博弈理论及其发展 被引量：2

Two-sided Matching Game Theory and It's Application
下载PDF
导出
摘要 匹配是市场的重要功能之一,匹配博弈理论运用博弈理论研究现实双方市场的稳定、及因缺乏稳定而失灵问题。2012诺贝尔经济学奖颁给了匹配博弈理论的创立者和推广应用者,然而国内对匹配博弈理论的研究几乎空白。鉴于此,本文系统介绍了匹配博弈理论的基本模型和算法,梳理了其应用领域及发展情况,并指出了未来的研究方向。 matching is one of the important functions of the market. Matching game theory uses the game theory model to study the stability and the failure of the real bilateral market. The 2012 Nobel Prize in Economics was awarded to two economists who established and applied matching theory, respectively. However the study of matching game theory in our country is rare. Therefore, this paper introduces the basic model and algorithm of matching game theory, arranges its applications and developments, and finally points out its research directions.
作者 李建荣 吴欲波
机构地区 华南师范大学数学科学学院 景德镇陶瓷学院学报期刊社
出处 《江西科技师范大学学报》 2014年第3期69-73,共5页 Journal of Jiangxi Science & Technology Normal University
基金 2012年度江西省高校人文社会科学研究项目"经济学中的逻辑问题研究"研究成果
关键词 匹配博弈 稳定匹配 替代偏好 matching game stable matching substitutable preference
分类号 F224.32 [经济管理—国民经济]
  • 相关文献

参考文献23

  • 1GALE,D.and L.SHAPLEY,1962,College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage[J].American Mathematical Monthly,69:9-15.
  • 2ADACHI,H.,2000,On a Characterization of Stable Matchings[J].Economics Letters.68:43-49.
  • 3ECHENIQUE,F.and J.OVIEDO,2006,A Theory of Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Markets[J].Theoretical Economics.1(2):233-273.
  • 4SOTOMAYOR,M.,1999a,Three Remarks On the Many-to-Many Stable Matching Problem[J].Mathematical Social Sciences.38:55-70.
  • 5SOTOMAYOR,M.,1999b,The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Utcomes of the Multiple Partners Assignment Game[J].International Journal of Game Theory.28:567-583.
  • 6KONISHI,H and M.U.UNVER,2006,Credible Group Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Problems[J].Journal of Economic Theory.129:57-80.
  • 7ABDULKADIROGLU A,PATHAK PA and ROTH A.E.The New York City High School Match[J].American Economic Review,Papers and Proceedings,2005,95(2):364-367.
  • 8ABDULKADIROGLU A,PARAG PA,ROTH A.E and SONMEZ T.Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism.Harvard University,Unpublished mimeo,2006.
  • 9TEO CP,SETHURAMAN J and WEE-PENG T.Gale-Shapley Stable Marriage Problem Revisited:Strategic issues and Applications[J].Management Science,2001,47:1252-1267.
  • 10ROTH A.E.The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents:A Case Study in Game Theory[J].Journal of Political Economy.1984a,92:991-1016.

二级参考文献9

  • 1Dutta, B. and J. Masso, 1997, "Stability of Matchings When Individuals Have Preferences over Colleagues," Journal of Economic Theory, 75 ( 2 ), pp. 464 - 475.
  • 2Echenique, F. and J. Oviedo, 2006, "A Theory of Stability in Many - to - Many Matching Markets," Theoretical Economics, 1 (2), pp. 233 - 273.
  • 3Echenique, F. and M. B. Yenmez, 2007, "A Solution to Matching With Preferences Over Colleagues," Games and Economic Behavior, 59, pp. 46 - 71.
  • 4Gale, D. and L. S. Shapley, 1962, "College Admissions and The Stability of Marriage," American Mathematical Monthly, 69 ( 1 ), pp. 9 - 15.
  • 5Kelso, A.S. and V. P. Crawford, 1982, "Job matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes," Econometrica, 50, pp. 1483 -1504.
  • 6Kominers, S. D. , 2010, "Matching with Preferences over Colleagues Solves Classical Matching," Games and Economic Behavior, 68, pp. 773 - 780.
  • 7Pycia, M. , 2012, "Stability and Preference Alignment in Matching and Coalittion Formation," Econometrica, 80 (1) , pp. 323 -362.
  • 8Revilla, P. , 2007, "Many - to - One Matching When Colleagues Matter," Mimeo, Universidad Pablo de Olavide.
  • 9Roth, A.E. and M. A. O. Sotomayor, 1990, Two - Sided Matching : A Study in Game - theoretic Modeling And Analysis, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England.

共引文献3

引证文献2

江西科技师范大学学报
2014年 第3期

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部