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惩罚困境、社会资本与群体合作秩序 被引量:1

Punishment Dilemma,Social Capital and Group Cooperation Order
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摘要 非强互惠第三方惩罚是维持群体合作秩序的必须手段,但其本身具有难解的困境,而强互惠惩罚则是缓解困境的重要措施。在具备强互惠惩罚条件的群体中,可侧重嵌入群体社会资本的强互惠惩罚;在不具备强互惠条件的群体中,则应侧重非强互惠第三方惩罚,两种惩罚相互配合能有效缓解惩罚的困境,最大限度地发挥惩罚的作用。因而只有培育群体社会资本,以非强互惠第三方惩罚为后盾,充分发挥强互惠惩罚的作用才能更和谐地维持群体合作秩序。 Non-strong reciprocal third-party punishment is a necessary means to maintain the order of groupcooperation. However, the means has some knotty dilemma of its own, which can be softened only by strong recip-rocal punishment as an important measure. Therefore, strong reciprocal punishment can be embedded in group so-cial capital if the groups are qualified for strong reciprocal punishment. But non-strong reciprocal third-party pun-ishment is to be introduced if the groups are not qualified enough for strong reciprocal punishment conditions. Aproper combination of the two punishments can help effectively soften the dilemma of punishment and exercise thefunction of punishment to the greatest degree. Thus to harmoniously maintain the order of group cooperation, thefunction of strong reciprocal punishment should be fully promoted by developing group social capital under the sup-port of non-strong reciprocal third-party punishment.
出处 《陕西师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第4期28-37,共10页 Journal of Shaanxi Normal University(Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)
基金 广东省哲学社会科学规划项目(09E-29)
关键词 惩罚困境 社会资本 第三方惩罚 群体合作 强互惠 punishment dilemma social capital third-party punishment group cooperation strong reci-procity
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