国家重点生态功能区生态补偿契约设计与分析

Design and Analysis of Ecological Compensation Contract to National Key Ecological Function Zone

建立生态补偿机制已成为各国政府为保护生态环境而达成的共识,而国家重点生态功能区的设立是完善我国生态补偿机制的重要组成部分。本文基于契约设计的视角,依据委托一代理理论构建了中央政府与县级政府的国家重点生态功能区生态补偿转移支付契约模型。首先,对中央政府和县级政府的行为选择进行界定,构建国家重点生态功能区生态补偿最优契约;其次,在完全信息契约形式的基础上,设计了三种不对称信息条件下国家重点生态功能区生态补偿转移支付契约,通过分析中央政府和县级政府的最优行为选择,得出了最优的转移支付契约形式;再次,运用成本收益分析,对信息不对称条件下契约影响因素的变动进行数值模拟,讨论不同信息结构状况下,不同价值类别资源比例、保护成本差异以及保护努力达到目标的概率等因素对契约成本的影响;最后,对完善国家重点生态功能区生态补偿转移支付提出政策建议。

Establishing ecological compensation mechanism has become the consensus of governments to protect the ecological environment, the establishment of national key ecological function zone is an important part of improving the ecological compensation mechanism in China. Protection of ecological resources of national key ecological function zone depends on the effort of the county government, the central government should provide transferpayment to the county government to motivate the enthusiasm of ecological protection. The national key ecologicalfunction zone transfer payment is implemented by signing the ecological compensation contract between the centralgovernment and the county government, but the information asymmetry will reduce the efficiency of transfer paymentcontract, then designing the optimal ecological compensation contract is the main point to transfer payment s of national key ecological function zone. Based on the perspective of contract design, the paper constructs a contract model between central government and county level government about transfer payment for national key ecological function zone by using the theory of principalagent theory, analyzes the optimal behavior choice of the central government and the county government under the conditions of different information structures. Firstly, the paper analyses the behavior choice and the benefit function of the central government and the county government, defines the ecological compensation contract to national key ecological function zone form a perspective of principalagent, and constructs the optimal contract under the condition of the minimum cost of the centralgovernment, provides the basic model for the following study. Secondly, based on the contract form under the condition of symmetric information, the paper designs the optimal ecological compensation transfer payment contract to national key ecological function zone under the condition of three kinds of asymmetric information, as hidden of protection efforts information, hidden resources value category information and hidden both protection efforts and resourcesvalue category information, discusses the optimal behavior choice of the central government and the county government under the conditions of different information, and find out the optimal transfer payment under the four kinds ofconditions of information asymmetry. Again, this paper uses the costbenefit analysis to discuss the effect of influencing factors to contract cost, such as the proportion of different resources value categories, the differences of protection cost and the probability of reaching the target by means of numerical simulation method, the results show thatthe total program cost increases with the protection cost rising in the hidden protection information situation, the contract cost increases with the proportion of the high value categories of resources in the hidden both protection effortsand value category information situation, and under the same conditions, the information rent of the high value categories of resources depends on the probability of reaching the target by different protection efforts. Finally, the paperthinks that the central government should provide diversification ecological compensation contract to national key ecological function zone according to the specific situation, in order to improve the efficiency of transfer payment policyof ecological compensation, draw up suitable contract according to the different value categories of resources oravailable efforts information under the different conditions of information asymmetry, achieve the target both efficiency and fairness of ecological compensation transfer payment.