上市方式、政治支持与盈余质量——来自中国家族企业的证据

Listing Approach,Political Favours and Earnings Quality——Evidence from Chinese Family Firms

中国家族企业的上市方式反映了家族企业可从地方政府获得的政治支持,该种支持将对公司的财务报告行为产生影响。本文以2003-2008年的中国上市家族企业为样本进行分析,发现:与买壳上市的家族企业相比,通过公开发行直接上市的家族企业可获得更多的银行贷款、政府补贴和更低的实际税率,而其盈余质量显著低于买壳上市的家族企业。分样本检验的结果显示,直接上市的家族企业所获得的政治支持与其盈余质量显著负相关。

The listing approach taken by Chinese family firms relates to the political favours that a family firm can obtain from local government,which could have a significant impact on corporate financial reporting behaviour. Using a sample of Chinese family firms over the period from 2003 to 2008,we find that family firms going public through initial public offerings( IPOs) obtain more bank loans,more subsidies and lower tax rates than firms going public through a takeover. Further investigation of the relation between listing approach and the quality of financial reporting shows that the earnings quality is systematically worse for family firms going public through IPOs than those going public through a takeover. Subsample regressions reveal that,in IPO firms,the magnitude of political favours obtained is negatively related to the quality of financial reporting.