重大资产重组、审计师行业专长与审计师变更

Material Assets Reorganization,Auditor Industry Specialization,and Auditor Switching

通过建立审计成本模型,分析重大资产重组引发的审计师变更行为。以2007—2012年A股上市公司为样本,实证分析重大资产重组、审计师行业专长和产权性质的共同作用对审计师变更行为的影响。研究发现,发生重大资产重组的上市公司,审计师变更的可能性更高;审计师行业专长能够抑制重大资产重组上市公司的审计师变更行为;审计师行业专长的抑制作用在国有产权性质的上市公司中更为显著。

Based on the established audit cost model, we analyze the auditor switching behavior arising from the material assets reorganization. Using a sample of A-share listed companies during the 2007--2012 period in China, we examine empirically the joint effects of material assets reorganization, auditor industry specialization, and ownership of auditor switching behavior. The results reveal that the likelihood of auditor switching increases after companies carry out material assets reorganization. Furthermore, auditors with industry specialization are more likely to inhibit auditor switching behavior following material assets reorganization. Further findings show that the inhibition effects are more significant in the nature of state ownership companies.