创始高管团队薪酬激励对真实盈余管理的影响研究

Influence of the Original TMT's Compensation Incentives on Real Earnings Management

以2009—2012年的创业板市场上市公司为样本,研究了创始高管团队不同薪酬激励形式对真实盈余管理水平的影响。结果发现,创始高管团队的货币薪酬、在职消费程度均与真实盈余管理水平存在一种显著的U型曲线关系,表明了货币薪酬和在职消费对真实盈余管理的两面性影响。而创始高管团队的股权薪酬与真实盈余管理水平正相关,这表明并不是股权薪酬越高,真实盈余管理水平越低,这意味着提高股权薪酬会加大对真实盈余管理的诱发行为。

This paper investigated the influence of the original TMT＇s compensation incentives on real earnings management u- sing samples of listed companies on GEM during 2009--2012. The empirical result is that original TMT＇s monetary compensation and non-pecuniary compensation have the U-shape relation with the level of real earnings management, which indicates the influences of both-sides on the level of real earnings management. While stock-based compensation shows a positive relation to real earnings management, indicating that the stock-based compensation is far from being higher, the level of real earnings management is lower, and blindly improving stock-based compensation will induce real earnings management.