摘要
在资本市场中,只要存在信息不对称和利益博弈,会计舞弊和盈余管理的动机和借口就永远存在。对于财务舞弊和盈余管理的治理,是很难通过消除压力和借口来取得成效的,只有尽量减少机会因素,即行为实施的条件和机会,才能真正取得实质性成效。由于两者在行为后果和法律责任上的截然不同,因而相应的治理策略也有所不同。对于会计舞弊的治理则需要以"治"为主、"防""治"结合的策略,事前的有效防范、事后外部审计的有效监督和发现后的严厉惩罚缺一不可。对于盈余管理问题,只能通过不断改革和完善相关会计政策规范,加强信息披露等来压缩盈余管理的空间,同时还应通过制度建设和道德建设来引导公司的行为,才能逐步减少盈余管理对会计信息质量的影响。
In capital markets, motivation and excuses for accounting frauds and earnings management exist as long as there are information asymmetry and benefit game. It is hard to acquire fruitful outcome through eliminating stress and excuses;substantial effect in governing accounting frauds and earnings management could only be obtained through cutting down opportunity elements in terms of conditions and opportunities for conducting the behavior. As the consequence and legal liability of the two are entirely different, respective governance strategies are different. Accounting frauds shall be administered by focusing on punishment with the help of precaution strategies. The pre-caution, supervision of external auditing and severe punishment of exposed frauds are indispensable. The space for earnings management could be compressed by a constant reform, improvement of relative policies and regulations, and information disclosure. In addition, corpo-rate behavior could be guided through institutional improvement and moral construction. In so doing, the impact of earnings management on accounting information quality could be reduced gradually.
出处
《商业经济》
2014年第13期113-115,共3页
Business & Economy
关键词
上市公司
会计舞弊
盈余管理
策略
public-listed company
accounting fraud
earnings management
strategy