摘要
在对不同减排水平的企业征收差异碳税的基础上,以社会总福利最大化为目标,建立政府主导的Stackelberg博弈模型,研究政府和排放依赖型双寡头企业的决策问题。实证分析表明,征收差异碳税有利于增强减排企业的市场竞争力,激励其进一步加大减排的投入,提高净化率。
On the basis of levying discriminated carbon tax on firms with different emission intensity reduction level, this paper constructs a stackelberg game model to study the decision-making problems of government and duopoly enterprises. The empirical results show that imposing discriminated carbon tax help the enterprise with emission reduction enhance market competitiveness and improve its purification rate.
出处
《软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第8期21-25,共5页
Soft Science
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71072155)
