高管薪酬契约设计、研发投资行为与公司财务绩效

The Contract Design of Executive Emolument,the Executive Behavior of R&D Investment and the Financial Performance of Corporation

本文以2007～2011年中国深沪A股585家上市公司为样本,运用联立方程组和三阶段最小二乘法,研究了高管薪酬契约设计对高管R＆D投资行为,以及高管R＆D投资行为对公司财务绩效的影响关系.研究发现：（1）在国有控股公司,R＆D投资没有纳入高管考核变量和年薪支付依据,增加高管年薪却诱导高管减少R＆D投资;在私有控股公司,R＆D投资已纳入高管考核变量和年薪支付依据,增加高管年薪能够激励高管增加R＆D投资.（2）在国有控股公司,高管股权报酬能够激励高管增加公司R＆D投资;在私有控股公司,高管持股比例对R＆D投资的影响具有区间效应.（3）无论是国有控股公司,还是私有控股公司,增加公司当期R＆D投资都会降低公司当期财务绩效,但会提高公司未来财务绩效.

Taking the 585 A-shares listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen over 2007 2011 as examples,this paper researches the impacts of the contract design of executive emolument on the executive behavior of R＆D investment and the executive behavior of R＆D investment on the financial performance of corporation through the application of simultaneous equations and three-stage least-squares method, research results indicate that ： （ 1 ） increasing executives＇ annual salaries can incentive executives to increase R＆D investment in the private-controlled companies,while alluring executives to decrease R＆D investment in the state-controlled companies. （2）Executives＇ stock compensation can incentive executives to increase R＆D investment in the state-controlled companies, but there is an interval effect relationship between executives＇ shareholding ratio and R＆D investment in a private-controlled companies. （3） Increase R＆D investment will reduce company＇s current performance, but it will improve the company＇s fixture performance in any company.