公司风险承担决定因素研究——基于两权分离和股权制衡的分析

What Determines Corporate Risk Taking: An Analysis Based on the Seperation of Cash-flow Right and Control Right,and Ownership Structure

本文基于2000年至2010年中国上市公司数据从第二层代理成本视角出发,以现金流权与控制权分离和股权制衡两个维度,对公司风险承担的决定因素及其作用机制进行了实证研究。结果表明,控股股东的现金流权与公司风险承担呈U型关系;现金流权与控制权分离度与公司风险承担呈倒U型关系。同时,公司存在多个大股东会通过制衡控股股东进而显著地提升公司风险承担。本文证明降低两权分离度、优化股权结构有助于公司承担合理风险实现创新绩效。

In the perspective of corporate risk-taking,the paper attempts to shed a new light on agency problem. By asserting that the corporate risk-taking is a reflection of agency problem,the paper conducts an empirical re.search involving subjects in China＇s stock market from 2000 to 2010 ,which helps unleash the redation between the separation of cash flow right and control right and corporate risk taking as well as the effect of ownership structure on corporate risk taking. Supported by the result,the view is held that the redation between cash flow right held by dominant shareholder and corporate risk taking pre.sents U-shape ,while the separation of cash flow right ti＇om control right and corporate risk taking pre.sents a reverse Ushape. Additionally ,the power and pre.sence of multiple large shareholders will mitigate the agency cost by enhancing the corporate risk-taking. As an evident and essential indicator of firms＇ capability in innovation,the corporate risk taking offers us a good lens to reflect on the influence exerted by corporate governance on firms＇ strategic change and innovative capability.