内外部治理机制对公司年度业绩预告行为及其信息特征的影响!

Analysis of Annual Earnings Preannouncement

以跟踪分析师数量衡量公司来自外部的监督力度,以股权性质、股权制衡程度、盈余管理程度衡量公司内部治理效率,据此考察内外部治理机制对公司年度业绩预告行为及其信息特征的影响,其实证结果发现,分析师的存在有效推动了年度业绩预告的发布,从而提高了公司的信息透明度,且跟踪分析师越少,公司越倾向于延迟预告并以"坏消息"居多,但不必然影响预告用语的精确度;相对于国有企业而言,非国有企业更愿意预告年度业绩,但一旦决定预告,非国有企业预告用语更模糊,并以"好消息"居多;大股东间股权制衡程度越高,公司发布业绩预告的可能性越小,但一旦预告,这类公司的预告用语更精确、时点更滞后;公司年度业绩预告行为有一定的延续性。总的来说,内外部治理机制都对公司年度业绩预告行为及其信息特征产生了重要影响。

This paper investigates the effects of internal and external governance mechanism on annual earnings preannouncement and its characteristics. Using analyst number following to measure the entity's supervision from outside,and ownership nature,equity restriction degree and earnings management to measure internal efficiency of governance,empirical results show that analyst following promotes the disclosure of annual earnings preannouncement,thus increasing information transparency. The less analyst following is,the later annual earnings preannouncement is disclosed and the more bad news presents. Relative to SOEs,non-SOEs prefer to preannounce yearly earnings,but the precision is lower and good news is predominant. The higher the degree of equity restriction among top five shareholders,the less annual earnings preannouncement is,but when it is disclosed,precision is higher and date is later. We also find that the behavior of annual earnings preannouncement does have continuity. In general,effective external supervision and internal governance mechanism do influence annual earnings preannouncement and its characteristics.