摘要
在阐述农村土地整治项目经济学特征的基础上,探讨农村土地整理项目实施中存在的委托代理关系,诊断农村土地整理项目委托代理关系的基本问题,并建立激励约束机制,使代理人的主观努力符合委托人的利益。研究结果表明:农村土地整治具有公共物品属性,农村土地整治项目具有双层多级委托代理关系,委托代理关系中存在道德风险、逆向选择等代理人问题。完善激励约束机制,成立农村土地整治项目业主委员会,有效优化农村土地整治项目委托代理关系,加强契约激励约束、监理人激励约束和市场激励约束,有效激励代理人努力水平,促进农村土地整治项目绩效水平不断提高。
Based on the meticulous description of the economic characteristics of rural land consolidation project,the paper discussed the principal-agent relationship in the implementation process of the rural land consolidationproject, diagnosed the basic problems of principal-agent relationship for rural land consolidation project, and es-tablished a incentive and restraint mechanism, under which the agent忆s subjective efforts can meet the interests ofthe client. The results showed that rural land consolidation projects have the properties of public goods and doub-le multi-level principal-agent relationship, but in the principal-agent relationship there are potential agent prob-lems such as the moral risk, adverse selection, and so on. For the rural land remediation project performance tobe continuously improved, the incentive and restraint mechanism should be established, the owners of the com-mittee for rural land remediation project set up, the principal-agent relationship of rural land consolidation projectoptimized, the incentive and restraint mechanism of contract, the incentive and restraint mechanism of supervi-sor, and the incentive and restraint mechanism of market perfected, and the agent's effort level effectively moti-vated.
出处
《南京农业大学学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第3期44-51,共8页
Journal of Nanjing Agricultural University(Social Sciences Edition)
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71173112)
江苏省国土资源科技计划项目(201335)
南京农业大学人文社会科学重大招标项目(SKZD201302)
关键词
农村土地整治项目
委托代理
激励约束机制
构建
Rural Land Consolidation Project
Principal-agent
Incentive and Restrictive Mechanism
Construc-tion