分析师关注影响信息披露的及时性吗?——基于A股上市公司的经验证据

The Timeliness of Information Disclosure Is Influenced by Analyst Coverage:Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

证券分析师作为一种非正式的外部治理机制,在公司治理过程中发挥着重要作用。以2001—2012年中国A股上市公司为样本,实证检验分析师关注对信息披露及时性的影响。研究发现:样本期间,分析师的关注使得上市公司信息披露更加及时;区分审计意见类型,相对"非标"意见公司,分析师关注使得"标准"意见公司信息披露更加及时。该研究结论有助于加深对上市公司信息披露行为的理解,为分析师的外部监督职能研究提供增量证据。

As a kind of informal external governance mechanism, securities analysts play an important role in the process of corporategovernance. This paper empirically analyzes the analyst coverage influence on the timeliness of information disclosure by taking 2002 to2012 A-share listed companies as the sample. The findings suggest that the analyst coverage will make listed companies discloseinformation more timely. Distinguishing the audit opinion report type, further research shows that the analyst coverage will make thecompany with standard audit opinion disclose information more timely. The conclusions help to deepen our understanding of the listedcompanies;information disclosure behavior, providing incremental evidence for the research of analysts;external oversight function.