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“公司+农户”型农产品供应链协调机制研究 被引量:3

The Coordination Mechanism of “Company & Farmers”Supply Chain Based on System Dynamics
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摘要 在分析"公司+农户"型农产品供应链系统的结构及要素间的动态反馈关系的基础上,构建了"公司+农户"型供应链合作机制的系统动力学模型。借助VensimPLE平台与政策模拟方法研究了不同合作机制下公司与农户利润的演化规律。研究结果表明:保护价合作机制能够有效保护农户的利益,提高农户的履约率,但此时公司承担全部市场风险,其利益得不到保障,公司违约的可能性较大;为了规避市场风险,采用"保护价+期权"模式,公司通过农产品期权市场进行套期保值,能有效化解供应链系统的内部风险,获得相对稳定的收益。"保护价+期权+生产协作+保证金"合作机制可进一步提高供应链的绩效,使公司和农户的利润都得到改善。 The system dynamic model of “Company &Farmers”supply chain is proposed on the bases of analyzing the dynamic behavior characteristics and feedback relationships between the elements of the system. With the help of VensimPLE software platform and policy simulation method,we study the profit evolution law of both the company and the farmer under different cooperation mechanism.We find the protection price contract can protect the interests of farmers effectively,thus increase the farmers’compliance rate.But the default prob-ability of the company may increase because the company bears all the market risks under the price protective contract.In order to resolve the internal risk of system,the “protective price + option”mode is developed. The results show that option hedging can help to reduce the market risk and achieve relative stable income of the company.In addition,we find the “protective price + option + production cooperation +caution money”mode can further enhance the performance of the system.And the profit of both the company and farmers can increase.
作者 李杰梅 杨扬
出处 《昆明理工大学学报(社会科学版)》 2014年第4期61-68,99,共9页 Journal of Kunming University of Science and Technology(Social Sciences)
基金 昆明理工大学人才培养基金项目"面向质量安全的食品供应链仿真与优化研究"
关键词 “公司+农户”型供应链 协调机制 系统动力学 仿真 合作模式 'Company & Farmers'supply chain coordination mechanism system dynamics simulation cooperative model
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参考文献15

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