银行监管、监管有效性与银行风险承担:跨国异质性分析

Bank Supervision,Supervisory Effectiveness and Bank Risk-taking:Cross-country Heterogeneity Analysis

为了考察银行监管、监管有效性对银行风险承担的差异性影响，本文选取85个国家和地区1998-2011年间的相关数据进行实证分析。结果发现：（1）较强的银行监管增加了以Z值测量的银行信用风险；（2）较强的资本要求、业务限制监管降低了银行的不良贷款率。但监管权力的增强却会提高银行的不良贷款率；（3）由于银行监管对银行信用风险的影响依赖该经济体的监管有效性水平，因而表现出很强的异质性；（4）按人均收入水平标准将各经济体划分为高收入经济体和低收入经济体组别后，结果发现银行监管对银行风险承担、银行监管与监管有效性之间的相互影响在两组别上也存在很强的异质性。

Using data cross 85 countries or regions from 1998 to 2011,the paper examines the heterogeneous effects of bank supervision,supervisory effectiveness on bank risk-taking.The findings suggest that stringent bank supervision increases bank credit risk measured with Z score.Stringent capital requirement and activities restrictions reduce non-performing loans while forceful supervisory power boosts non-performing loans.The effect of bank supervision on bank credit risk presents great heterogeneity since it depends on the level of the supervisory effectiveness.The effect of bank supervision and the mutual effect among bank supervision and supervisory effectiveness on bank risk-taking appear great heterogeneity in high income and low income economies groups partitioned according to income per capita.