财政分权、转移支付与地方政府福利性支出效率

Fiscal Decentralization,Transfer Payments and the Efficiency of Local Government Welfare Expenditure

分税制改革加强了中央财权，在支出高度分权的条件下，中央政府利用大规模转移支付平衡地区财力，尤其是提高落后地区的福利性支出。这样的分权模式在制度设计上既注重效率也兼顾公平。然而数据描述却显示各地区福利性公共物品的差距并没有随着财力均等化而逐渐消失。为了解释该现象，本文利用1998-2006年地市级数据进行的计量分析显示，随着专项和一般性转移支付的增加，地方福利性支出效率下降，而税收返还和支出效率之间显著正相关。这符合经典财政分权理论，即由缺少信息优势的中央政府安排支出会降低效率。此外，“粘蝇纸效应”也是造成地方福利性支出效率下降的另一个原因。这些结论为未来的转移支付制度改革提供了政策参考。

The reform of tax system in China strengthens the ability of central government.Because of the greater expenditure responsibility for local government,central government has to use large-scale transfers to reduce the regional fiscal disparities,especially in poor areas.This decentralization model not only focuses on the design of the system efficiency but also consideration of fairness.However,the data shows that the regional disparity of the welfare expenditure is not disappearing with the fiscal equalization.In order to explain this phenomenon,using Chinese prefecture areas data from2002 to 2006,the article shows that with the special and general transfer payment increasing,the efficiency of local welfare expenditure is decreasing;but the efficiency of tax return is increasing.This is consistent with the classical theory of fiscal decentralization——central government expenditures with weak information on local demand will reduce efficiency,and the 'flypaper effect' is another reason for the inefficiency.These conclusions provide policy reference for future transfer payment system reform.