委托代理理论下科技查新委托关系与付费模式的探析

The Agency Relation and Payment Term of Sci-tech Novelty Retrieval Based on the Principal-agent Theory

基于委托代理理论分析科技查新工作中的委托关系及存在的缺陷。现行查新业务实施过程中的委托关系只涉及项目申请者或成果完成者即查新委托人和查新机构即查新代理人双方,为直线形的失衡结构。此关系下的查新付费模式会导致查新委托方与代理方的共谋,丧失查新工作的独立性。提出引入政府部门作为查新业务实际委托人的新型查新委托关系,并由实际委托人直接向查新机构支付查新费用,以期从根本上保证查新工作的独立性和真实公允性。

Based on the principal-agent theory,this paper analyzes the agency relation of sci-tech novelty retrieval and its defect. The agency relation of sci-tech novelty retrieval in current form is linear imbalanced structure. The payment term under this agency relationship will influence the independence of sci-tech novelty search. This paper introduces gov-ernment departments as the actual client in sci-tech novelty search work and proposes the novel payment term in order to guarantee the independence and authenticity.