经理自主权、高管薪酬与公司业绩术——文献综述与理论分析

Managerial Discretion, Managerial Compensation and Firm Performance： A Literature Review and Theoretical Analysis

近年来我国上市公司高管薪酬与公司业绩的反向关系受到理论界和企业界的关注，委托代理理论已不能有效解释高管薪酬问题。引入经理自主权理论，基于公司治理视角分析经理自主权与高管薪酬的关系，并进一步探讨两者的匹配性对公司业绩的影响，已成为高管薪酬研究的新趋势。基于对于现有文献的梳理，通过理论分析发现，①经理自主权对高管薪酬水平有显著正向影响；②经理自主权对高管薪酬业绩敏感性具有非线性影响，从而导致后者具有“向下刚性”的特征；③经理自主权对高管薪酬差距的影响效应使得两者之间呈现显著的倒U型关系；（D经理自主权与高管薪酬水平、高管薪酬业绩敏感性、高管薪酬差距的有效匹配能够更好的促进公司业绩。

Recently, with the failure that principle-agent theory cannot effectively explain the managerial payment, the inverse relation between managerial payment and corporate performance in listed companies in China has received much attention from theorists and practitioners. The new direction of research on managerial payment is that from the management perspective, the relationship between managerial discretion and managerial payment is investigated, and further how the match of managerial discretion perception and managerial pay influences firm performance is explored. Based on the literature review and theoretical analysis, several conclusions are proposed. Managerial discretion has positive effect on managerial pay level; Managerial discretion has non-linear effect on managerial pay-performance sensitivity, and thus the later has the feature of rigidity to decrease;The effect of managerial discretion on managerial pay gap makes the relationship between them an inversed-U relationship; The match of managerial discretion with managerial pay, managerial pay-performance sensitivity and the pay gap can effectively improve firm performance.