资产减值的可转回性、管理层责任与管理层投资决策——一项实验证据

The Reversibility of Asset Impairments, Responsibility and Investment Decisions of Management: An Experimental Research

本文基于心理和行为视角,采用实验研究方法,分析和检验了资产减值的可转回性对管理层投资决策的影响,以及管理层责任对上述影响的调节作用。研究发现,与资产减值不可以转回相比,当资产减值可以转回时,管理层会增加对已减值部门的后续投资;管理层责任对资产减值的可转回性与投资决策的关系具有调节作用,当管理层对资产减值负有责任时,与资产减值不可转回相比,在资产减值可以转回的情况下,管理层会增加他们后续的投资;当管理层不对资产减值负有责任时,在资产减值可以转回和资产减值不可以转回的情况下,管理层后续的投资没有显著差异。本文还发现,资产减值的可转回性通过改变管理层对未来业绩的信心,进而影响管理层的投资决策。我们的研究不仅有助于理解资产减值转回与管理层投资决策的关系,也为评价现行资产减值准则的合理性提供了新的视角,对准则制定者和管理层具有重要的意义。

From the perspectives of psychology and behavior, this article uses experimental method to examine the effect of the reversibility of the accounting effect of asset impairments on managers＇ investment decisions. Meanwhile, the study also examines the moderating effect of management＇ responsibility for the asset impairment on the relationship between the reversibility of the accounting effect of asset impairments and managers＇ investment decisions. The results of the experiment indicate that managers invest more in the impaired division subsequently when the accounting effect of the impairment is reversible than when the accounting effect of the impairment is irreversible. We also find the moderating effect of management＇ responsibility for the asset impairment on the relation between the reversibility of the accounting effect of asset impairments and managers＇ investment decisions, i.e. we find the effect of the reversibility of the accounting effect of asset impairments on managers＇ investment decisions depends on management＇ responsibility for the asset impairment. Specifically, when managers are responsible for the asset impairment, managers invest more in the impaired division subsequently when the accounting effect of the impairment is reversible than when the accounting effect of the impairment is irreversible; however, when managers are not responsible for the asset impairment, there is no significant difference in managers＇ subsequent investment when the accounting effect of the impairment is reversible and when the accounting effect of the impairment is irreversible. Meanwhile, we further find out that the effect of the reversibility of the accounting effect of asset impairments on managers＇ investment decisions is mediated by managers＇ confidence in future performance of the impaired division, that is to say, the reversibility of the accounting effect of asset impairments affects managers＇ confidence in future performance of the impaired division, which in turn affects managers＇ investment decisions. Our study not only enriches understanding of the relations between the reversibility of the accounting effect of asset impairments and managers＇ investment decisions, but also provides new insight into evaluating the rationality of the accounting standards, which have important implications for accounting standard setters and management.