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信息披露是否有利于公共品的合作供给? 被引量:3

Can Information Disclosure Really Improve The Cooperation of Public Good Provision
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摘要 本文在标准线性公共品博弈的基础上引入了环境不确定性,对信息披露在公共品合作供给当中的作用进行了研究,以解决以往信息披露研究中信息反馈区分度不够的问题。实验的结果显示信息披露无法改进公共品的合作供给这一结论是较为稳健的。实验的结果还表明,人们对组织中其他成员合作行为的乐观性具有一定的现实基础,而对环境的乐观性则纯粹是一种盲目的乐观。 This paper relates environment uncertainty to standard linear public good game and studiesthe effect of information feedback in public good provision. We intend to solve the problem thatinformation feedback cannot be really distinguished from no information feedback in previousreaserches. Our experiment results implicate that information feedback has no effect on the cooperationof public good provision is a robust conclusion. The results also reveal that people express optimismabout their cooperators' behavior can make some sence, however, people's optimism aboutenvironment uncertainty makes no sence.
作者 黄国宾
出处 《南方经济》 CSSCI 2014年第8期105-112,共8页 South China Journal of Economics
基金 中国人民大学科学研究基金(中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助)项目"财政分权与节能减排--基于转移支付的视角"(14XNH040)成果
关键词 信息披露 信息反馈 公共品合作供给 估计 Information Disclosure Information Feedback Cooperation of Public Good Provision Belief.
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参考文献23

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二级参考文献97

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