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集团内部资本市场与成员企业价值——基于集团成立财务公司的事件研究 被引量:8

Business Group Internal Capital Market and Member Companies' Value:A Case Studs Based on Business Groups with Finance Companies
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摘要 本文系统地研究了我国集团公司成立财务公司对集团成员企业业绩变化及其业绩变化的影响因素。实证结果表明,集团成立财务公司后,集团成员公司的业绩出现显著的下降,与配比公司相比,成立财务公司的集团成员企业业绩差于未成立财务公司的集团成员企业,但成立财务公司集团的成员企业的业绩变化比后者变化平稳。研究表明,内部资本市场理论能够解释我国集团企业成立财务公司后成员企业业绩下降。对于成员企业业绩变化的影响因素研究得出,成员企业的成长性越高,成员企业的业绩减少的越快;同时,成员企业的债务水平越高,越有利于抑制成员企业价值的下降。 This paper systematically investigates the changes and causes of Chinese business group members' performance afterfounded group finance company. Empirical results documented that, after founded the group finance company the performance ofbusiness group members decrease sharply and statically significant. Compared to the matching companies, performance of businessgroup which founded finance company is lower than that of matching companies, but the changes of performance are smoother thanthat of matching companies. It is documented that, internal capital market theory can explain the performance decrease of groupmembers after founded the finance company. After founded the finance company, member companies with more growth opportunitieshave less performance decline, and member companies with more debts can inhabit the value decline of member firm more effectively.
作者 顾亮 李维安
出处 《证券市场导报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第8期31-37,共7页 Securities Market Herald
基金 国家社科重大项目"完善国有控股金融机构公司治理研究"(10ZD&035) 国家自然科学基金重点课题"我国集团企业跨国治理与评价研究"(71132001) 教育部人文社会科学一般规划项目基金"公司治理:制度安排还是现实选择?--一个因果关系的研究框架"(10YJA630028) "长江学者和创新团队发展计划"资助(IRT0926)
关键词 集团 内部资本市场 财务公司 business group internal capital market finance company
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